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Abstract—The current ubiquity of information coupled with
the reliance on such data by businesses, has led to a great
deal of resources being deployed to ensure the security of this
information. Threats can come from a number of sources and
the dangers from those insiders closest to the source have
increased significantly recently. This paper focuses on techniques
used to identify and manage threats as well as the measures that
every organisation should consider to put into action. A novel
game-based onion skin model has been proposed, combining
techniques used in theory-based and hardware-based hardening
strategies.
Keywords - Attack graph, attack tree, network hardening,
threats
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of electronic systems and ubiquity of
access to the information they hold, increased a risk that a
confidential data can be lost or accessed by those criminally
minded. In the last few years a number of cases when
a confidential data was being compromised has increased.
Statistics from Verizon and Ponemon studies on the cost of a
data breach showed, that in 2009 a total cost of data breaches
continues to increase reaching $202 (US) per compromised
record [1], [2]. The statistic is discouraging and the cost of
each security incident is extremely high. Despite regulations,
laws and awareness of the need to protect information assets,
data breaches continue to grow and evolve. From the same
statistic source [1], [2], an attack difficulty recorded in 2009
has increased by a few points comparing to the cases recorded
in 2008. While ten years ago cybercrime was for a reason of
vandalism, now the large increase is for financial gain. On
the whole , while the criminals are not working hard in order
to compromise the network, decision makers struggling with
the implementation of new, more effective systems that would
minimise an impact of an incident, if such was.
High demand in development of novel network security strate-
gies and models is highly discussed between researchers and
developers. The more the technology evolves the harder it
becomes to stabilise the system due to interdependence of the
assets and other measures.
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A large body of work has been undertaken in the field of
network security. However, our analysis concentrates on the
models and strategies that have been proposed in order to help
decision makers to optimally invest into security safeguards
and maximally defend their systems. Furthermore, we pay
an attention on the techniques that concentrate on managing
internal and external threats. In particular, we are making
an analytical evaluation of the network hardening models
proposed to identify and manage threats for the purpose of
further developments and refinements.
This paper gives an overview of existing models and strategies
that have been proposed based on the theoretical and practical
analyses, experiments and knowledge. The overview will start
from hardening models were attack graphs and attack trees is a
common term being used. Followed by identifying the graphs
and the trees usefulness, an evaluation will be performed.
An analysis and evaluation of the cost models will concentrate
upon the metrics, used to define an optimal strategy and
methods to derive a solution.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. A back-
ground regarding network hardening using modelling tech-
niques is introduced in Section II. A notion of modelling
techniques such as attack graphs and attack trees is explained
in Section III, as well as the areas of use and appropriateness.
In Section IV, we make an analytical comparison of three
hardening models, based on the modelling technique, aim,
variables used and advantages it provides. In Section V we
have proposed an onion skin model based, in particular, on the
game-based models. Finally, conclusion is drawn in Section
VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Network hardening is a process or a procedure that is based
on vast range of techniques, strategies and methodologies
which are used to evade multiple attacks or threats. Hardening
a network does not always mean spending large quantities
of money. Nevertheless, money are required in some form,
whether the hardening procedure is undertaken on changing
a hardware or on man power. In fact, hardening procedure
depends on what are the needs of each organisatusingion and
what has to be addressed. In this sense, the time as a form
of money may come when extra man hours are required to
repair the damage revealed due to an exploit.
From the work undertaken on network hardening models,
most common modelling techniques used to derive a solution
for network hardening is by the use of attack graphs [3], [4],
[5] or attack trees [6]. Furthermore, network hardening rarely
is used in the theory of game-based models [7], where the
game is played between a defender and an attacker in order
to effectively analyse each player’s strengths and weaknesses.
A process of identifying and managing threats is the key
destiny of security specialists, in order to effectively run the
business and keep the system up and running. In particular,
when we talk about computer security, we mean that we are
addressing aspects of:
Confidentiality - ensures that computer-related assets can
only be accessed by authorised parties
Integrity - means that assets can be modified only by
authorised parties and only in authorised ways
Availability - means assets are accessible to authorised parties
at appropriate times.
Most of the hardening techniques are addressed to detect
external attacks and preventive measures to minimise the
damage. However, many organisations are more suffering
from insiders than external attackers. This is due to insiders
have some level of privileges assigned and some kind of
knowledge about preventive measures that they first will try to
overcome. Being aware of inside threats, organisations should
maximally limit access to the information by implementing
strong access control system and other prevention measures.
In fact, some level of risk will still remain.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. A notion of an attack graph
Attack graphs are widely applied in a network hardening
concept in order to effectively represent a prior knowledge
about vulnerabilities, their dependencies and network
connectivity [5]. Each path in an attack graph is a series
of exploits, which lead to an undesirable state. The state
is an event that has an undesirable impact on the system.
Furthermore, such a concept of attack graphs is used to answer
questions like ”To what attacks is my system vulnerable to?”,
”How many different ways an attacker can take to reach
his goal?”, ”Which set of measures should an administrator
deploy to ensure the attacker cannot achieve his goal?”.
According to [8] attack graphs can serve as accompanying
tool in several areas of network security, including intrusion
detection (in particular help in IDS alert prioritisation) [9],
defence, forensic analysis and security policy considerations.
There are three different representations for an attack
graph. First, an attack graph can accurately enumerate all
possible vulnerability sequences (attack paths) an attacker
can follow [10]. Nevertheless, such graphs faced scalability
problem, due to explosion in the number of attack paths.
Second, a monotonicity assumption has partially overcome
a scalability problem by making an assumption stating
that an attacker never relinquishes an obtained capability.
This assumption helped to derive a graph containing all
required information about dependency relationships among
vulnerabilities [11]. Third, [12] has overcome a scalability
problem by constructing a two-layer attack graphs, which
in sense have reduced computation cost and simplified the
graph itself. The monotonicity assumption is also applied to
generate the graph.
In overall, an attack graph represents all possible attack
sequences that an attacker may use to break into a network.
An attack sequence is described as a single path in the graph
and the dependencies between the paths are the relations
between the vulnerabilities. As a result, attack graphs can
provide meaningful and quantitative conclusions in analysing
network security [12].
Commonly an attack graph can be represented with exploits
and conditions [3]. An exploit is a predicate v(hs, hm, hd),
where hs is a source host from which a vulnerability v was
initiated, hd is a destination host, hm an intermediate host.
However, two hosts can be used as v(hs, hd, in case of no
intermediate hosts exist on the path. A condition is a predicate
c(hs, hd), where a security condition c is satisfied on source
host hs and destination host hd (when no intermediate hosts
are used). A condition can be treated as an existence of
the vulnerability or the connectivity between source and
destination hosts. Although, there two types of directed edges
that link exploits and conditions. First, an edge that can point
from a condition to an exploit denotes the require relation.
The require relation is always conjunctive and means the
exploit cannot be executed unless the condition is satisfied.
Second, the edge pointing from an exploit to a condition
denotes the imply relation, which is always disjunctive. The
imply relation means executing the exploit will satisfy the
condition [3].
Definition 1 Given a set of exploits E, a set of conditions C,
a require relation Rr ⊆ CxE, an imply relation Ri ⊆ ExC,
an attack graph is G(E ∪ C,Rr ∪Ri) .
One important aspect of attack graphs is that an exploit
cannot be realised until all conditions have been satisfied.
However, some exceptions do exist. In case when an
exploit with multiple variations may require different sets of
conditions. This case can be handled by having a separate
vertex for each variation of the exploit. Another case is when
a collection of exploits may jointly imply a single condition.
This case is handled by the insertion of dummy conditions to
capture the conjunctive relationship [3].
A new approach of two-layer attack graphs has provided
an advantage of vividly analysing graphs, finding dangerous
hosts inside a network and process several targets at the
same time [12]. The generation model consists of host-pair
attack(Figure 1(b)) and hosts access graphs (Figure 1(b)).
The host-pair attack graph has the same meaning as an
attack graph, where one source host connects to one target
host directly. However, the resulting host-pair attack graph is
(a) A host access graph (b) A host-pair attack graph
Fig. 1. Illustration of attack scenarios by using a host access and host-pair attack graphs.
small in size and is generated quickly. The information used
is linked to target host’s hd vulnerabilities, configurations
and its network connection to the source host hs. The hosts
access graph shows the number of hosts in the network and
the attacker’s access privilege transition between hosts. This
graph is build based on the host-pair attack graph. A directed
edge represents the access relationship between two hosts. In
case an attacker can obtain a root privilege on target host hd
the directed edge will be placed between corresponding nodes.
B. A notion of an attack tree
Similarly to attack graphs, attack trees are used to visualise a
networked system containing possible risks and attack paths.
The structure of the tree is more convenient than in attack
graphs, due to simplified categorisation of ways a system can
be attacked. The term was first introduced by Schneier [13].
In an attack tree, the nodes represent attacks. The root node in
the tree is a destination of the attacker, in other words, is the
goal of an attacker. Children of a node are refinements of this
goal and leafs represent attacks that can no longer be refined
[14]. Moreover, there are AND and OR nodes. OR nodes are
alternatives - for example, two ways to get into a building.
AND nodes represent different steps in achieving a goal. An
attacker cannot achieve the final goal unless both subgoals are
satisfied. The tree concepts can be used to analyse attributes of
the security of the system, for example, probability of an attack
success, the cost, cheapest low-risk attack, defence methods,
whether special tools are needed. How does this work? First,
the value should be assigned for each node, in fact, nodes
will have different values corresponding to many different
variables. Second, prioritise the nodes according to the value
determined. This will give information on what nodes are more
critical and require more attention.
A basic attack tree is shown in Figure 2(a). This graph helps
to identify possible risks, such as eavesdropping or dictionary
attack, that could be avoided if appropriate measures would
be in place. Such measures are the use of strong passwords,
do not share your login details with anyone or stick them in
front of the monitor.
Example of a cost analysis by the use of an attack tree
is shown in Figure 2(b). This kind of analysis can give
information on the cost of an attack. Using quantitative
metrics, the value of an attack can be calculated and the
further assessment undertaken.
IV. HARDENING MODELS
For the purpose of evaluation we have made a classification
of network hardening models based on the methodology used.
Each of the models in some way use modelling techniques to
identify threats, either internal or external, however, the aim
of the hardening models differs.
1) Theory-based models (Risk management, assessment
strategies)
2) Game-theory models
3) Hardware based hardening models (IDS/IPS, Firewall)
Theory-based models are the ones that concentrate on the
risk assessment process used to assess the likelihood of an
event occurring, implement measures that are designed to
reduce the risk and ensure that an organisation can respond
to an event so that the consequences will be minimised
[16]. The common idea used in this type of models is an
implementation of risk assessment strategies used to identify
and manage threats. Risk assessment process generally can be
assessed by implementing qualitative and quantitative metrics
and techniques. The qualitative scenarios can be illustrated by
modelling attack trees [15], [6] and determining the path in
the tree that could lead to disastrous state. This approach is
widely used to visualise possible threats. Attack graphs, as a
modelling technique is not applicable to assess the likelihood
of events occuring, as it is time consuming and error-prone to
justify the value of risks and investing into security controls
from the complex generated graph. The quantitative approach
uses quantitative metrics and help decision makers to select
among number of good value security solutions a most
profitable one gained from the risk assessment methodology.
Use of attack trees for quantitative risk assessment is not
effective, because it is difficult, or even impossible, to obtain
the actual costs related to an incident and threats, either
internal or external, evolve over time.
Game-theoretical analysis is useful for analysing, mod-
elling, decision and control processes for network security [7].
(a) An attack tree (b) Cost of an attack
Fig. 2. Illustration of an attack tree including a cost of an attack.
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF HARDENING MODELS
Risk Assessment [15] Attack-Defence Game model [7] IDS sensor placement [9]
Technique used Attack trees Defence graphs Attack graphs
Defence Trees Attack graphs
Aim Identify threats Strengthening the system Optimal IDS
Determine the Minimise the cost sensor placement
value of an attack of an attack Discover multi-step
attacks
Variables Single Loss Attack damage Host configuration
Expectancy (SLE)
Annual Rate of Defence operation cost Vulnerable services
Occurrence (ARO)
Expected gain from attacker Residual damage Network connectivity
Cost of safeguards Negative damage Critical network assets
Costs of an attack Defence cost Threat sources
Advantage Combination of Total cost An attack graph
qualitative and of security guards comprising all known
quantitative methods is minimised attacks
Combination of Return on Optimal number
Security Investment (ROSI) of sensors
and Return on
Attack (ROA)
Disadvantage Interactions Simplistic model Alerts are prioritised
between safeguards Determining input based on attacks
are not considered variables is difficult closer to a critical
Lack of empirical asset
data for SLE Graph is complex
and ARO
An interaction between an attacker and a defender treated as a
two-player stochastic game, in which action sets, costs/reward
functions and transition probabilities can be defined. By cre-
ating a specific scenarios, game theory provide an information
such as attacker’s goal, steps he or she will follow, what are the
reward for each of the players, what are the expenses or how
are the resources utilised during an attack. Furthermore, this
methodology can be used not just to calculate a total cost of
implementing security safeguards, but minimise it and being
within budget. However, a game-theoretical analysis is rarely
used for managing insider threats.
Hardware based hardening strategies closely relate to intrusion
detection/ prevention system (IDS/IPS) and firewall rules
and actions [17], [18]. The actions initiated by the IDS are
largely discussed in the literature [19], [20]. Optimisation of
IDS sensors, optimal placement and minimisation of false
positives and false negatives is a prime concern for decision
makers. Efficient fitness functions solve the cost problem for
triggered false alarms and related responses, thus, increasing
better IDS/IPS performance. This type of strategies is mostly
oriented on traffic monitoring and anomaly detection and is
widely applied for misuse detection.
The three types of proposed hardening strategies are sum-
marised in Table I.
From Table I, attack graphs and attack trees are used as
a supplementary modelling technique used to visualise all
possible attack paths, vulnerabilities and vulnerability depen-
dencies. The use of modelling techniques help to solve vul-
Fig. 3. Generic onion skin model
nerability dependencies, predict possible attacks and estimate
the cost for known measures.
The risk assessment strategy proposed in [15] combines qual-
itative and quantitative methods to evaluate effectiveness and
economic profitability of countermeasures as well as their
deterrent effect on attackers. Use of attack trees as well as
defence trees gives a concept of how threats could be man-
aged and dealt with. An economic analysis using quantitative
metrics assigned to assumed attacks extends the method of
managing costs as well as security of the system. However,
the model is not time based and the risk assessment performed
yesterday might have very different results if performed tomor-
row.
Hardware based models, in particular, where IDS/IPS, fire-
walls are used to monitor the traffic either network or host,
to detect any anomaly, unknown patterns effectively can be
applied to manage insider threats as well as external ones. The
attack graphs are more applicable for this type of models as
they help to enumerate possible vulnerabilities,comprise pos-
sible insider threats, optimise number of sensors and minimise
the control costs.
The game-theory is rarely used in relation to attack mod-
elling techniques and insider threat management. However,
the outcome of the common mathematical functions formally
construct the possible actions of each player. Hardware based
strategies generally concentrate on IDS/IPS functionality, traf-
fic monitoring and optimisation of number of sensors and
their placement. Optimised number of sensors and maximised
efficiency of traffic monitoring help to detect an attack and
initialise an appropriate prevention action.
V. INSIDER THREATS AND HARDENING MEASURES
Paradoxically, despite of the prevalence of the continuous
user training and increased awareness of security threats, the
concern of the cases of fraud, espionage or sabotage is raising
among organisations due to attacks are approached by those
who know the system best: the insiders. Insider threats are
particularly devastating as all insiders are granted some level
of privilege and trust. At most organisations more effort are
putting against the external threats than the internal ones.
Why? The reason is simple: it is easier to stop, predict and con-
trol. To predict insider activities requires much administrative
effort which, in fact, is concentrated on monitoring external
sources.
A. Analysis of insider threats and proposed model
Insider threats are the most difficult traceable and
predictable threats due to insufficient access controls, policy
management, accidental or intentional data leakage and
other activities that can violate confidentiality and integrity.
Statistics show, that in many cases data was compromised
as a result of stolen or lost laptops, USB flash drives or
other hardware adopted for data storage [2]. The activities
such as social engineering, phishing scams, sabotage, theft of
intellectual property, employee fraud are the ones that always
keep the company at risk and hardly can be controlled.
One is saying: ”Prevention of an attack is ideal, but detection
is a must”. In fact, organisations always try to prevent
attacks as much as possible, however, the problem with
insider threat is that prevention does not scale very well. If
someone is intended to steal a piece of data he is going to
do so. Therefore, preventive measures should be teamed with
detective measures. Insiders usually have some knowledge
about network architecture and first will work around the
prevention measures. In this case, all actions should be put
to control and detect this activity in order to take follow-up
actions to stop insiders by prosecuting or taking other
measures against them [21].
Definition 2 The insider threat is one or more individuals
with the access and/or knowledge of organisation or
enterprise that would allow to exploit existing vulnerabilities
in network security, systems and services with the intent to
cause harm or financially benefit from malicious act.
The generic game-theory model using onion skin notation
is shown in Figure 3. We have categorised insider’s step-
by-step activity as four level procedure, that in some ways
should be achieved. A level one, is a physical access to the
system. An insider can overcome this layer by pretending to
be an authorised person, social engineering attack or other
methods that can be helpful in achieving the target. A level
two, is a technical layer, where all technical knowledge
about organisational architecture will be used in order to
act undetected. A level three is a logical layer, where all
authentication/authorisation, access control systems reside.
The fourth level is the most critical as the data that can be
copromised, altered or sold resides here. From the Figure
3, we call this level as assets. We assume that assests are
servers or data stored on databases. Furthermore, we assume
that it is not always a must to follow a step-by-step process.
The final goal of exploiting a database or stealing it manually
can be successfully achieved by jumping over the levels or
starting from a particular one.
On the left side of the onion model in Figure 3, a security
measures are deployed by defender. Each level in attackers
procedure can be controlled either by having CCTV installed
on site or by using strong access control systems. All
hardening measures that the defender will implement in some
way will stop or delay insider’s attempts. Major concepts
and issues that a defender should implement and maintain are:
• Maintain a vulnerability management program
• Risk and threat categorisation and assessment
• Insider computer fraud anomaly detection
• Information security pattern analysis
• Access control measures, track and monitor all access to
network resources
• Security awareness program
• Maintain a security policy
• Security testing
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of appropriate security and risk manage-
ment in modern society is well understood. However, there
are a number of methods available to security practitioners
to assist them in their decision making. In this paper we have
presented an analytical comparison of models where modelling
techniques such as attack graphs and attack trees are used for
detecting vulnerabilities, visualising their dependencies and
estimating the cost of possible attacks as well as finding a
minimal cost hardening measure.
Furthermore, we have proposed an onion skin model as a
modelling technique for managing insider threats. This model
is game-theory based and includes the defensive measures that
are vital in hardware/software and theory - based models, such
as the implementation of IDS/IPS, firewalls, risk management
and assessment. The model can be used to estimate a cost of
each defensive measure as well as cost of attack on each onion
skin level.
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